Will

Hastings' Dictionary of the New Testament

The consideration of the place of the will in the teaching of the apostolic writings must be carefully distinguished from the question of free will (see art. Freedom of the will). The line between them is not easy to draw in all cases; but the aim of this article is to consider the conception or conceptions of the will implied in the Acts and Epistles, and its relation to views current in modern psychological writings. At the present time there is a strong tendency to throw commanding emphasis on the will. All consciousness, it is agreed, implies the three factors, volition or conation, cognition, and sensation or feeling; but, if any one of these can be said to be primary, it is volition. Consciousness grows by functioning; and, except in its rudimentary stages, functioning is impossible apart from volition. Much attention has naturally been given to the relations between will on the one hand and wish and desire on the other, to the connexion between will and attention and habit, and also to the possibility of action against the will. Is the will a matter of detached impulses or is it properly the expression of the personality, the self? These questions are of great importance to the student of the NT. Schopenhauer, and later Nietzsche, raised the subject of the will to a new importance in philosophic discussion; and the questions mentioned above have been recently emphasized by the various writings of William James, and the important and far-reaching contentions of Eucken and of Bergson. The theist has a further set of questions to answer: What is the relation of the will of man to the will of God? Does the latter compel the former? And is it similar in kind? What is the real meaning of the ‘surrender of the will’ so often demanded in religious writings? Which should be placed highest in religion, the active and conative, the intellectual, or the emotional element?

All these questions, more or less connected with one another, occur at once to the mind; but in the NT no direct answer to them is to be found. The NT writers were not in any sense psychological analysts; their object was to describe their religious experiences and to induce them in others. Their psychological equipment for doing this-if the adjective can be used at all-was the language of the OT and the simple categories common to the conversation of plain but thoughtful men. In their psychology the Rabbis themselves were no more than thoughtful amateurs-perhaps the world has gained rather than lost thereby. On the other hand, the language of the NT writers on this subject-like their use, e.g., of the Greek prepositions-though simple, is surprisingly careful. They did not work out their theology; but a theology was implicit in all that they wrote; and, without being conscious of doing so, they have given us materials for a reasoned conception of the will, as it may be predicated of both God and man.

To understand this, we must first pay attention to the writers’ vocabulary. The choice of words is determined as much on subconscious as on conscious levels; we employ one expression and reject another instinctively; and in cases like the present, where a system or a belief is implicit rather than explicit, language yields some of our best evidence. The language of the OT suggests three manifestations of will: (a) desire and aversion-the latter perhaps more often actually expressed terms which can all be applied either to man or to God; (b) satisfaction in a certain state of things, real or contemplated-, with the cognate noun, a; these again are equally applicable to man and to God; (c) a continued and persistent purpose, or the phrase -; the former is more commonly used of man; the latter suggests the familiar connexion between will and attention, -being always regarded by the Hebrews as the seat of thoughts rather than of emotions. The NT writers start from the same circle of ideas. From the undifferentiated material of likes and dislikes are developed deep mental and moral satisfactions, and acute physical desires or loathings. Will, for or against, is the natural precursor of action. Two wills may clash-those of man and man or of man and God. And out of will may grow a steadfast purpose, good or evil, which may fix the destiny of the whole life. When we examine the NT vocabulary more closely, a further distinction emerges. ‘Will’ is expressed by both θέλω and βούλομαι and their cognate nouns, as well as by a further little group of words which must also be noticed.

θέλω is nearly always used of man. There are exceptions in  Acts 18:21,  Romans 9:18;  Romans 9:22,  1 Corinthians 4:19;  1 Corinthians 12:18;  1 Corinthians 15:38,  Philippians 2:13 (the only occurrence of the word in this Epistle),  Colossians 1:27, and  James 4:15. In the Gospels, the word in very commonly used of man in general, and of Jesus; rarely of God, outside the quotations from the OT-  Hosea 6:8 in  Matthew 9:13 and parallels, and  Psalms 22:8 in  Matthew 27:43. The non-classical cognate noun, θέλημα, however, is almost entirely used of God. There are exceptions in  Ephesians 2:3 (cf.  Ephesians 1:11) and  2 Peter 1:21. The word is generally singular, but the plur. occurs in  Acts 13:22 and  Ephesians 2:3. In  Hebrews 2:4θέλησις is found, also of God. The same usage is found in the Gospels, especially in the Fourth Gospel (‘the will of my Father,’ ‘of him that sent me’); the exceptions really prove the principle ( John 1:13,  John 5:30,  John 6:38).

The above makes it clear that the verb is used quite generally for ‘wish,’ ‘desire,’ and ‘want.’ The distinction common in English psychology since T. H. Green, between more and less conscious self-presentation in the act of will, is absent from the NT. But the verb covers a range wide enough to stretch from St. Paul’s favourite phrase, οὐ θέλω ὑμᾶς ἀγνοεῖν, to the baffling experiences hinted at in Romans 7. It can thus be used of both man and God. On the other hand, the noun is practically confined to the idea of a solemn Divine purpose; hence its inapplicability to human desires.

When we turn to βούλομαι we find that the verb is always used of man, except in  Luke 22:42,  Hebrews 6:17 (the only case where the word occurs in Heb.),  2 Peter 3:9, and  James 1:18 (cf.  Matthew 11:27,  1 Corinthians 12:11). The nouns βουλή and βούλημα are rare; βουλή is used about equally of God and of man (for the latter use see  Acts 5:38;  Acts 19:1;  Acts 27:12;  Acts 27:42; for the former  Ephesians 1:11 and  Hebrews 6:17; note also  1 Corinthians 4:5, βουλὰς τῶν καρδιῶν). In the Gospels it occurs only twice-in  Luke 7:30 of God, and in  Luke 23:51 of man. βούλημα is used once of man ( Acts 27:43), once of God ( Romans 9:19), and once of the ‘nations’ ( 1 Peter 4:3).

The verb thus denotes plan and settled deliberate purpose, rising, however, out of uncertainty, needing effort for its realization, and liable to frustration; hence it is unsuitable for application to God. The noun denotes a deliberate and settled choice, which is more appropriate to the calm omnipotence of God (cf.  Acts 2:23) than the ignorant strivings of man; it may, of course, imply a choice of alternatives, though not necessarily a long balancing between them. βούλευμα does not occur; βουλεύομαι is not used of God. βουλή, indeed, would seem to correspond somewhat nearly to the Aristotelian προαίρεσις (Eth. Nic. iii.). εὐδοκία denotes a choice in which satisfaction is found; it is used of both God and man; like the cognate verb, however, it is comparatively rare (cf.  Romans 10:1,  Philippians 1:15,  2 Thessalonians 1:11). In  Luke 2:14εὐδοκία corresponds to the Hebrew øÈöåÉï, and the whole phrase most naturally means ‘men in whom God feels satisfaction,’ not ‘good-will’ in the sense of the AV .

ἐπιθυμία, on the other hand, denotes an eager longing or craving, which may pass out of control and become πάθος, an overmastering passion. The verb ἐπιθυμέω is used only of man. It occurs outside the Gospels six times in a bad sense, twice in a good sense, and twice neutral; in the Gospels, however, out of six instances only one is bad. The noun is generally used in a bad sense, often with reference to bodily desires (note  John 8:44). Like the verb, it is never used of God. πάθος suggests an ungovernable passion in the three places where it occurs ( Romans 1:26,  Colossians 3:5,  1 Thessalonians 4:5). A deep and overmastering longing for a good object is expressed by ἐπιποθέω (e.g.  Romans 1:11,  2 Corinthians 9:14,  Philippians 1:6,  1 Peter 2:2; it also meets us in the obscure passage in  James 4:5).

Hence, out of the simple material of desires and aversions are developed overpowering cravings or settled purposes; when the latter become thought of as entirely fixed, they are connected exclusively with God. At the same time, NT language shrinks from the idea that God could actually deliberate. Thus the main distinction recognized by the language is religious rather than psychological; it is drawn between the will as manifested in man and in God rather than between the greater and less identification with the self.

But further questions arise at once. (1) What is the relation of a man’s will to God? Is a clash, as of two independent wills, really possible, until a point is reached where man says ‘Not as I will but as thou wilt’? (2) Is man’s will equally independent as regards evil? Here too we shall find no system; but we must ask whether by anything in the apostolic expressions an intelligible system is implied. We shall begin with the second point. Several expressions imply an influence exercised by evil, as itself an independent power, over the will-e.g.  Acts 5:3 : ‘Why hath Satan filled thy heart?’ (but note v. 9: ‘How is it that ye have agreed together to tempt the Spirit of the Lord?’);  2 Corinthians 2:11 : ‘that no advantage may be gained over us by Satan’;  2 Corinthians 4:4;  James 1:14 : ‘Each man is tempted, when he is drawn away by his own lust, and enticed’ (the words used suggest the metaphor of an angler).  Acts 8:23;  Acts 13:10 hint at the same idea, and perhaps  Galatians 3:1; cf. also  Romans 7:11;  Romans 7:20, where sin itself is spoken of as the agent of deception and death (cf.  Romans 8:20). This does not, however, destroy the responsibility of the sinner ( Romans 1:24;  Romans 1:26;  Romans 2:1;  Romans 2:5-6, and  Acts 28:25 ff. quoted from  Isaiah 6:9-10). The last passages imply a state; the evil will is a matter not of acts but of habits, or, as Aristotle would call them, ἕξεις (cf. Nic. Eth. iv. 2, 1122b 1). This state is called death, the absence of all will, or power, i.e. of all will to do good ( Ephesians 2:1,  2 Corinthians 4:3). Very similar language is used by St. Paul about the race as a whole-‘death passed unto all men, for that all sinned’ ( Romans 5:12). On the other hand, a man so dead can be made alive ( Ephesians 2:5,  Colossians 2:13); cf. also  1 John 3:14 : ‘We know that we have passed out of death into life, because we love the brethren.’ Life, however, means death to sin and to the Law which enslaved to sin ( Romans 7:6,  Colossians 2:20;  Colossians 3:3-4 : ‘Ye died, and your life is hid with Christ in God … Christ, who is our life’). To this state the term death (to sin) is applied, since here the will is regarded, at least by implication, as being ‘dead’ to evil impulses, as before to good ones. Yet it is note-worthy that the activity of the will is still called for-‘Let not sin reign in your mortal body’ ( Romans 6:11-12;  Romans 6:15); and that this activity is essential is shown very clearly by the appeals to moral conduct which occur regularly at the close of St. Paul’s Epistles, as well as elsewhere in the NT.

A definite cycle seems thus to be contemplated, whether as regards the race, the ‘heathen’ (Romans 1), or individuals: first, there is the active will to evil; then, evil becomes inevitable; the agent is practically powerless, ‘sold under sin’ ( Romans 7:14); then, after his rescue from this state, the will is again called for, but this time it points habitually in the opposite direction. That is to say, choice is a real thing, but it exists in a world which contains both certain definite uniform sequences and an enticing and enslaving power of sin and ‘lusts’ ( James 1:14). This is sometimes but not always connected with the discarnate personality called Satan (see artt. Devil, Sin).

But what of the rescue itself? Is it independent of man’s will? Does it simply depend on God’s decision to effect it, in some cases, but evidently not in others? Man’s will appears to be clearly called for in such passages as  2 Corinthians 5:20, ‘Be ye reconciled to God,’ but against them  Romans 9:18 may be quoted, and perhaps, though it is not dogmatic or doctrinal in tone,  Acts 2:21 (see Conversion, Freedom of the Will). However this antinomy is reconciled, there is no doubt that St. Paul regards grace and faith as vital to the change ( Ephesians 2:4;  Ephesians 2:8 : ‘God … quickened us together with Christ-by grace have ye been saved-… for by grace have ye been saved through faith; and that not of yourselves: it is the gift of God’; cf. also  Romans 4:5,  Galatians 1:15). By itself the reference to grace might imply that man was merely passive; but the call for faith (as we shall see below, faith is an act of the will) shows that this is very far from being the case; indeed, faith is in general emphasized considerably more than grace as the agent in conversion. A still more fundamental connexion between the activities of God and man is expressed in what at first seem wilful contradictions in terms, in  Philippians 2:12-13 and  Galatians 2:20 (‘Work out your own salvation … for it is God which worketh in you both to will and to work’; and ‘I live; and yet no longer I, but Christ liveth in me’). In  Galatians 3:25 we read of faith as ‘coming,’ with the result that we are ‘no longer under a tutor,’ but ‘sons of God through faith’ (cf.  1 Peter 1:13, ‘the grace that is being brought unto you,’ RVm ). But even in this new sphere of life through faith the will reappears, as a persistent endeavour after progress ( Philippians 3:12,  2 Peter 1:10). The new life is marked by special gifts-χαρίσματα-but they must be strenuously cultivated (Romans 12, 1 Corinthians 12). The whole Church may receive an illumination from the Holy Spirit, yet it will use language that implies co-operation rather than passivity ( Acts 15:28). The new condition can therefore be rightly called one of freedom (cf.  Galatians 5:13), and as such it is characterized by the confidence of open speech, as of equal with equal (παρρησία,  Ephesians 3:12,  Hebrews 3:6,  1 John 3:21).

It is thus quite clearly, though perhaps even yet not explicitly, recognized that will is something more than an impulse or a series of impulses, good or bad. It is the expression of the self, which, when bad, needs to be changed by an operation which has an external origin. Yet it is manifested in constant choices and struggles. The Christian is conscious of a new power in him ( Galatians 2:20), seizing him ( Philippians 3:12); yet the result is to produce in him for the first time the true activity. Transformed conation becomes the central thing in his life.

There is another aspect of the subject which is familiar to modern psychologists, and is not as entirely neglected in the NT as might at first appear. Conation is often represented as being almost identical with deliberate attention. Fully developed conation demands that prolonged presentation of on object to consciousness whose basis is voluntary attention. For the cultivation of self-control and the building up of character this truth is of the greatest importance. In the NT the chief elements in the growth of the Christian character are faith, hope, and love. To the new life, and therefore to the new will, these are vital. They have been regarded as being mainly emotional qualities. But this is a mistake. Each involves a trained and cultivated attention. This is clearly the case with Hebrews 11. The psychologist might well describe the conception of faith worked out in that famous chapter as the concentration of attention on what would otherwise be forced up to, or beyond, the margin of consciousness (esp.  Hebrews 11:6;  Hebrews 11:13-16;  Hebrews 11:27;  Hebrews 12:1). A wider rôle is assigned to faith in the Pauline Epistles, but the element of unswerving attention therein is clear from  Romans 4:20 and Galatians 3, (passim). This is even more marked in the Epistles of St. John. There faith is spoken of as the weapon by which the world is overcome ( 1 John 5:4-5). But the nerve of this faith is the conviction that Jesus is the Son of God; in other words, if the attention is concentrated on this object, the universe of evil around him is powerless to harm the Christian. In the Synoptic Gospels faith means confidence in the power of Jesus to do what He offers or is asked to do; but the demand for faith thus made involves the securing of attention by means of a strong suggestion. In  Philippians 4:8, St. Paul appears to recognize the value of wisely directed attention still more clearly.

It is not always easy to distinguish between faith and hope in the apostolic writings; hope, like faith, is directed on the unseen, and it demands endurance ( Romans 8:24-25), i.e. the deliberate holding of an idea before the mind; indeed, the connexion of hope with endurance rather suggests that it is the part of faith to set the object before the attention, and of hope to keep it there. Love, as St. Paul describes it in 1 Corinthians 13, is very much more than an emotion; it is distinctly an attitude; the qualities mentioned in  1 Corinthians 13:4-6 all point to attention directed to objects which most of us, especially under provocation, find it very hard to bear in mind. In the Epistles of St. John, faith, love, and obedience form an inseparable triad; the Christian character is secured, and fulfilled, by fixing the mind on Christ’s precepts and carrying them out. Of this process, love is both the pre-requisite and the end; and, if this seems a contradiction, we must remember that to the psychologist, as to the theologian, analysis is but a makeshift; everything that appears in the course of the development of a conscious state was there at the beginning, or it could not have come into existence at all. Love is the going out of the whole soul to God, or to men in eager desire for their highest bliss; but this is impossible apart from definite mental concentration. The three Christian graces thus imply attention, and are all conative.

It is strange that all this was not analyzed further in the NT. But the main interest of the writers, after all, lay in God’s will, not in man’s. The patience needed by the descriptive psychologist was impossible for men whose one desire was to express the highest rapture of their lives, the sense of the redeeming and sanctifying will of God surging through every part of their being. And this constant turning of the attention to God led them to emphasize aspects of God’s will which might seem to come near to fatalism, were it not that God’s will is always thought of as acting through the good man, not outside of him. These aspects are four: a certain irresistible compulsion experienced by the Apostles, reminding one of Socrates’ daimon, but going far beyond it ( Acts 16:6-7;  Acts 18:5); a curious sense of the ‘fated,’ or πεπρωμένον, as a classical Greek might have called it, which especially pervades Acts 20, 21, 27; the eschatological expectation, prominent in the earlier Epistles of St. Paul and in Rev.; and, side by side with this cosmical aspect of the sovereign will of God, the recognition of a moral necessity, especially in the sufferings of the Messiah, which formed the great fulfilment of prophecy ( Acts 3:18;  Acts 3:21,  Hebrews 2:10;  Hebrews 7:26). In fact, we may almost think of God’s will as a kind of primum mobile, the all-embracing sphere by which the other spheres are controlled and set and kept in motion. The maturity of man’s will is thus an attainment, not an endowment. It acts properly only when it is roused and directed by Divine grace. The necessity for its exercise will never be superseded; but the more it is exercised under Divine control, the more it becomes God’s will in man, and the more it becomes man’s own will, acting at last in complete freedom. St. Paul’s metaphors of the soldier and the athlete are quite natural and harmonious. They provide room for the sternest endurance and struggle, and yet they point to the perfect precision and joy of well-disciplined activity. And this perfect precision is not simply in obedience to God’s will; it becomes the actual manifestation of God’s will. So experienced, God’s will is identical with His love. It ‘moves the sun and the other stars’; it is the πρῶτον κινοῦν.

We are now in a position to sum up briefly the relation of the NT conception of the will to modern psychological discussions. Cognition, conation, and feeling are all recognized; activity is central and is something more than response to impulse; it is self-expression as opposed to wish or desire. Action against the will is possible, but only when the will is itself imperfect. Surrender of the will is really re-affirmation of the will in a new direction. The conceptions of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, however, the ‘will to life’ or ‘to power,’ constitute a perilous self-assertion which can only lead to death. There is much in the thought of St. Paul that recalls Eucken. The controlling force of the world is spiritual; and into the little land-locked pools of our own individuality, soon becoming stagnant if left to themselves, must flow the great tides of the Divine will. But that will is personal and redemptive; it is not a mere force, however exalted; it is the loving activity of the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ. St. Paul has less in common with Bergson. The principle of life is not merely change; nor is its action experimental and uncertain. It moves onward through all time with a directness which can also communicate itself to our own wills. Finally, we may refer to the well-known phrase of the pragmatist William James, the ‘will to believe.’ The expression is not meant to state a relation between will and belief, but is used to suggest that belief (whatever its psychological analysis) is founded only on a subjective and individual choice, not on truth or fact. Mathematical formulae and scientific ‘laws’ are accepted by us because they ‘work’; God’s love and man’s immortality are accepted for the same reason. To St. Paul the principle, so stated, would have been incomprehensible or impious. Love and immortality are true because they are ‘revealed,’ brought to light; it is the function of will to fix the mind on them, and act in accord with them. W. James’s view is a simple case of ὕστερον πρότεον. As a psychological or philosophical basis for belief, its correctness is not here in point; what is significant to the student of NT thought is that the great doctrines of Christianity are there felt to become more and more clear as the will accepts and obeys them. The will does not create truth; but there is not a truth which the will does not illumine and test ( John 7:17,  1 John 2:20;  1 John 2:27;  1 John 5:20).

Literature.-For representative modern discussions of the question of the will in general see J. Martineau, Study of Religion2, 2 vols., Oxford, 1889, vol. ii. bk. iii. ch. ii.; H.Lotze, Microcosmus, Eng. tr. , 2 vols., Edinburgh, 1885, vol. i. p. 256 ff.; J. Ward, Naturalism and Agnosticism, London, 1899; G. F. Stout, Analytic Psychology2, 2 vols., do., 1902, vol. ii. chs. ii., iii., xi.; W. James, Varieties of Religious Experience, do., 1902, lectures ix., x., Will to Believe, do., 1902, pp. 1 ff., 145, ff.; H. Bergson, Time and Free Will, do., 1910, ch. iii. For discussions of the subject from a theistic point of view see T. B. Strong, Christian Ethics, do., 1896, chs. i., ii; W. L. Walker, Christian Theism and a Spiritual Monism, Edinburgh, 1906, pt. ii.; W. R. Inge, Faith and its Psychology, London, 1909; G. Galloway, Philosophy of Religion, Edinburgh, 1914. For the psychology of religion see E. D. Starbuck, Psychology of Religion, London, 1899, chs. xxv.-xxvii.; J. B. Pratt, Psychology of Religious Belief, New York and London, 1907; G. B. Cutten, Psychological Phenomena of Christianity, London, 1909, ch. xxv. For the biblical conceptions of the will see H. Wheeler Robinson, Christian Doctrine of Man, Edinburgh, 1911, ‘Hebrew Psychology in Relation to Pauline Anthropology,’ in Mansfield College Essays, London, 1909; H. Weinel, St. Paul, the Man and his Work, Eng. tr. , do., 1906; W. P. DuBose, The Gospel according to St. Paul, do., 1907. See also Literature under art. Freedom of the Will.

W. F. Lofthouse.

Watson's Biblical & Theological Dictionary

"In his primitive condition as he came out of the hands of his Creator, man was endowed with such a portion of knowledge, holiness, and power, as enabled him to understand, esteem, consider, will, and to perform the true good, according to the commandment delivered to him: yet none of these acts could he do, except through the assistance of divine grace. But in his lapsed and sinful state, man is not capable, of and by himself, either to think, to will, or to do that which is really good; but it is necessary for him to be regenerated and renewed in his intellect, affections or will, and in all his powers, by God in Christ through the Holy Spirit, that he may be qualified rightly to understand, esteem, consider, will, and perform whatever is truly good. When he is made a partaker of this regeneration, or renovation, since he is delivered from sin, he is capable of thinking, willing, and doing that which is good, but yet not without the continued aids of divine grace." Such were the sentiments of the often misrepresented Arminius on this subject; to which is only to be added, to complete the Scriptural view, that a degree of grace to consider his ways, and to return to God, is through the merit of Christ vouchsafed to every man. Everyone must be conscious that he possesses free will, and that he is a free agent; that is, that he is capable of considering and reflecting upon the objects which are presented to his mind, and of acting, in such cases as are possible, according to the determination of his will. And, indeed, without this free agency, actions cannot be morally good or bad; nor can the agents be responsible for their conduct. But the corruption introduced into our nature by the fall of Adam has so weakened our mental powers, has given such force to our passions, and such perverseness to our wills, that a man "cannot turn and prepare himself by his own natural, strength and good works to faith and calling upon God." The most pious of those who lived under the Mosaic dispensation often acknowledged the necessity of extraordinary assistance from God: David prays to God to open his eyes, to guide and direct him; to create in him a clean heart, and renew a right spirit within him,  Psalms 51:10;  Psalms 119:18;  Psalms 119:33;  Psalms 119:35 . Even we, whose minds are enlightened by the pure precepts of the Gospel, and urged by the motives which it suggests, must still be convinced of our weakness and depravity, and confess, in the words of the tenth article, that "we have no power to do good works pleasant and acceptable to God, without the grace of God preventing us, that we may have a good will, and working with us when we have that good will." The necessity of divine grace to strengthen and regulate our wills, and to cooperate with our endeavours after righteousness, is clearly asserted in the New Testament: "They that are in the flesh cannot please God,"  Romans 8:8 . "Abide in me," says our Saviour, "and I in you. As the branch cannot bear fruit of itself, except it abide in the vine, no more can ye, except ye abide in me. I am the vine, and ye are the branches: he that abideth in me, and I in him, the same bringeth forth much fruit; for without me ye can do nothing,"  John 15:4-5 . "No man can come to me, except the Father, which hath sent me, draw him." "It is God that worketh in you, both to will and to do of his good pleasure," Php_2:13 . "Not that we are sufficient of ourselves to think any thing as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is of God,"

 2 Corinthians 3:5 . "We know not what to pray for as we ought, but the Spirit helpeth our infirmities,"  Romans 8:26 . We are said to be "led by the Spirit," and to "walk in the Spirit,"  Romans 8:14;  Galatians 5:16;  Galatians 5:25 . These texts sufficiently prove that we stand in need both of a prevenient and of a cooperating grace. This doctrine we find asserted in many of the ancient fathers, and particularly in Ambrose, who, in speaking of the effects of the fall, uses these words: "Thence was derived mortality, and no less a multitude of miseries than of crimes. Faith being lost, hope being abandoned, the understanding blinded, and the will made captive, no one found in himself the means of repairing these things. Without the worship of the true God, even that which seems to be virtue is sin; nor can any one please God without God. But whom does he please who does not please God, except himself and Satan? The nature, therefore, which was good is made bad by habit: man would not return unless God turned him." And Cyprian says, "We pray day and night that the sanctification and enlivening, which springs from the grace of God, may be preserved by his protection." Dr. Nicholls, after quoting many authorities to show that the doctrine of divine grace always prevailed in the catholic church, adds, "I have spent, perhaps, more time in these testimonies than was absolutely necessary; but whatever I have done is to show that the doctrine of divine grace is so essential a doctrine of Christianity, that not only the Holy Scriptures and the primitive fathers assert it, but likewise that the Christians could not in any age maintain their religion without it,—it being necessary, not only for the discharge of Christian duties, but for the performance of our ordinary devotions." And this seems to have been the opinion of the compilers of our excellent liturgy, in many parts of which both a prevenient and a cooperating grace is unequivocally acknowledged; particularly in the second collect for the evening service; in the fourth collect at the end of the communion service; in the collect for Easter day; in the collect for the fifth Sunday after Easter; in the collects for the third, ninth, seventeenth, nineteenth, and twenty-fifth Sundays after Trinity. This assistance of divine grace is not inconsistent with the free agency of men: it does not place them under an irresistible restraint, or compel them to act contrary to their will. Our own exertions are necessary to enable us to work out our salvation; but our sufficiency for that purpose is from God. It is, however, impossible to ascertain the precise boundary between our natural efforts and the divine assistance, whether that assistance be considered as a cooperating or a prevenient grace. Without destroying our character as free and accountable beings, God may be mercifully pleased to counteract the depravity of our hearts by the suggestions of his Spirit: but still it remains with us to chose whether we will listen to those suggestions, or obey the lusts of the flesh. We may rest assured that he will, by the communication of his grace, varied often as to power and distinctness, help our infirmities, invigorate our resolutions, and supply our defects. The promises that if we draw nigh to God, God will draw nigh to us, and pour out his Spirit upon us,  James 4:8;  Acts 2:17 , and that he will give his Holy Spirit to every one that asketh him,  Luke 11:13 , imply that God is ever ready to work upon our hearts, and to aid our well doing through the powerful, though invisible, operation of his Spirit: "The wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh and whither it goeth; so is every one that is born of the Spirit,"  John 3:8 . The joint agency of God and man, in the work of human salvation, is pointed out in the following passage: "Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling; for it is God that worketh in you both to will and to do of his good pleasure," Php_2:12-13; and therefore we may assure ourselves that free will and grace are not incompatible, though the mode and degree of their cooperation be utterly inexplicable, and though at different times one may appear for a season to overwhelm the other. This doctrine has, however, been the subject of much dispute among Christians: some sects contend for the irresistible impulses of grace, and others reject the idea of any influence of the divine Spirit upon the human mind. The former opinion seems irreconcilable with the free agency of man, if held as the constant unvarying mode in which he carries on his work in the soul of man, and the latter contradicts the authority of Scripture; "and therefore," says Veneer, "let us neither ascribe nothing to free will, nor too much; let us not, with the defenders of irresistible grace, deny free will, or make it of no effect, not only before, but even under, grace; nor let us suffer the efficacy of saving grace, on the other hand, to be swallowed up in the strength and freedom of our wills; but, allowing the government or superiority to the grace of God, let the will of man be admitted to be its handmaid, but such a one as is free, and freely obeys; by which, when it is freely exerted by the admonitions of prevenient grace, when it is prepared as to its affections, strengthened and assisted as to its powers and faculties, a man freely and willingly cooperates with God, that the grace of God be not received in vain." "All men are also to be admonished," observes Cranmer, in his "Necessary Doctrine," "and chiefly preachers, that in this high matter they, looking on both sides, so temper and moderate themselves, that they neither so preach the grace of God that they take away thereby free will, nor on the other side so extol free will, that injury be done to the grace of God." And Jortin remarks: "Thus do the doctrine of divine grace and the doctrine of free will or human liberty unite and conspire, in a friendly manner, to our everlasting good. The first is adapted to excite in us gratitude, faith, and humility; the second, to awaken our caution and quicken our diligence."

Many, indeed, relying on mere abstract arguments, deny free will, in the strict meaning of the term, altogether, and define the mental faculties of man according to their various fancies. But the existence and nature of our moral and rational powers are and ought to be, in true philosophy, the subject of mental observation, not the sport of hypothesis. Those who love metaphysical abstractions may people the worlds of their imagination with beings of whatsoever character they prefer; but the nature and capabilities of man, as he really is, must be determined not by speculation but by experience. It is true that this experience is the object of consciousness, not of the senses; and, accordingly, each man is, in some respect, the judge in his own case, and may, if he chooses, deny his own freedom and his power of self control, or of using those means which God hath appointed to lead to this result. But this is seldom done in ordinary life, except by those abandoned individuals who seek, in such a statement, an excuse for capricious or unprincipled conduct,—an excuse which is never admitted by the majority of reasoning persons, much less by the truly pious. The latter, indeed, will always be found attributing any thing good they achieve to the cooperating efficacy of superior assistance. But they will, with equal sincerity, blame themselves for what they have done amiss; or, in other words, acknowledge that they should and might have willed and acted otherwise; and this is exactly the practical question, the very turning point, on which the whole controversy hinges. The only competent judges in such a question, says Dr. R. H. Graves, are those who have made it the subject of mental observation, exertion, and pursuit; or, in other words, those who have sought after righteousness, under whatever dispensation,  Acts 10:35;  Romans 2:7;  Romans 2:10 . And surely the confessions, the prayers, the repentance, and the sacrifices of the humble and pious of all ages show that they felt, not only that they were themselves to blame for their actions, and therefore that they might have done otherwise, that is, they had a free will, but that, to make this will operative in spiritual matters, they required an aid beyond the reach of mere human attainment. Some may fancy this statement inconsistent in itself; and I allow that it cannot satisfy the mere speculative supporters either of free will or its opponents. But to me it seems the testimony of conscience and experience, which, in natural religion, must, as I conceive, be preferred to abstract hypothesis. The inquiry is not how the mind may be, but how it is actually, constituted. This surely is a question of fact, not of conjecture, and must therefore be decided by an appeal to common sense and experience, not by random speculation. Again: even those who in theory contend for the doctrine of necessity, yet in all the affairs of life where their interests, comforts, or gratifications are concerned, both speak and act as if they disbelieved it, and as if they really imagined themselves capable of such self determination and self control, as to improve their talents, their opportunities, and their acquirements, and so to exercise a material influence on their worldly fortunes. But suppose the assertions of individuals, as to their consciousness in this particular, to disagree. It is then evident, that, the question being as to the nature of man in general, it must be determined by the voice of preponderating testimony. But how, it may be asked, are the suffrages to be collected? Since the judgment of each individual must in this scheme be considered as a separate fact, how is a sufficiently extensive induction to be made? In answer, it may be asserted, that in every civilized nation the induction has been already made, the suffrages have been taken, the case has been tried, and the decision is on record. And the verdict is the most impartial that can be looked for in such a case, because given without any reference to the controversy in dispute. All human laws, forbidding, condemning, and punishing vicious actions, are grounded on the acknowledged supposition that man is possessed of a self control, a self determining power, by which he could, both in will and in deed, have avoided the very actions for which he is condemned, and in the very circumstances in which he has committed them. Nor would it be easy to find a case where the criminal has deceived himself, or hoped to deceive his judges, by pleading that he laboured under a fatal necessity, which rendered his crimes unavoidable, and therefore excusable. The justice of all legislative enactments evidently and essentially depends on the principle, that the things prohibited can be avoided, or, in other words, might have been done otherwise than they were done; and this is the very turning point of the controversy. Accordingly, in whatever instances such freedom of will is not presupposed, (as in the cases of idiots and madmen,) the operation of such enactments is suspended. All nations, therefore, who consent to frame and abide by such laws, do thereby testify their deliberate and solemn assent to the truth of this principle, and, consequently, to the existence of free will in man; and do certify the sincerity of their conviction by staking upon it their properties, their liberties, and their lives. Numberless other instances might be adduced in which the practice of mankind implies their belief in this principle. And so conscious of this are the opponents of free will, that they generally deprecate appeals to common sense and experience, and resort to metaphysical arguments to examine what is in truth a matter of truth, not of conjecture; or, in other words, to determine, not what man is, but what they imagine he must be. In their reasonings they differ, as might have been expected, as much from each other as they do from truth and reality. But the experience of common sense and conscience will always decide, that no man can conscientiously make this excuse for his crimes, that he could not have willed or acted otherwise than he did. The existence of the above faculties in the human mind once acknowledged, leads, by necessary inference, to the admission, that there exists in the great First Cause a power to create them. Not, indeed, that these faculties themselves exist in him in the same manner as in us, but the power of originating and producing them in all possible variety. We can indeed conclude, that having created all these in us, his nature must be so perfect that we cannot attribute to him any line of conduct inconsistent with whatever is excellent in the exercise of these faculties in ourselves. And therefore we cannot ascribe to him, as his special act, any thing we should perceive to be unworthy of any just or merciful, any wise or upright, being. But this furnishes no clue whatever to a knowledge of the real constitution of his nature, or of the manner in which his divine attributes exist together. In truth, we no more comprehend how he wills than how he acts, and therefore we have no better right to assert that he wills evil than that he does evil. Again: we as little understand how he knows as how he sees, and therefore might as well argue that all things exist in consequence of his beholding them, as that all events arise in consequence of his foreknowing them. In short, all that can be inferred by reason concerning the intrinsic nature of the invisible, unsearchable Deity, must be admitted by the candid inquirer to be no better than conjecture. And he who should hope from such doubtful support as his fancied insight into the unknown operations of the divine mind to suspend a system of irrespective decrees, embracing the moral government of the world, would but too much resemble him who should imagine the material globe adequately sustained if upheld by a chain whose highest links were wrapped in clouds and darkness. Thus our affirmative knowledge of the Deity, as derived from this part of our inquiry, consists in the certainty, (though his nature is unknown to us,) that he is the creative source of all that is great, glorious, and good, in heaven or in earth; while we may negatively conclude, that his moral government shall, on the whole, be conducted in a manner not inconsistent with whatever is excellent in the exercise of power and wisdom, justice and mercy, goodness and truth. Nor is it a little important, as connected with the present inquiry, to keep in mind this distinction between our affirmative and negative knowledge in this matter. For it shows us that as, on the one side, we cannot pretend to such an insight into the nature and character of the divine knowledge as to deduce therefrom a system of eternal and irrespective decrees; so neither, on the other, can this system of moral government be ascribed to the Deity, because it would be manifestly unworthy, not merely of him who has created all moral excellence, but of any of those beings on whom he has conferred the most ordinary degrees of mercy and justice. The natural benefits or evils arising out of moral or immoral practices are, in fact, so many rewards or punishments, exhibiting the Being who has so constituted our nature as a moral governor. This part of his government may not be so clearly discernible in individual instances, because much of the happiness and unhappiness attending virtue and vice is mental and invisible. In the case of nations, however, considered merely as bodies politic, the internal sanction of an approving or reproaching conscience, of subdued or distracting passions, can have no existence; and therefore the external sanctions are more uniformly enforced. Hence, whoever carefully examines the dealings of Providence with the human race will admit, that national prosperity has ever kept pace with national wisdom and integrity; whereas, the greatest empires, when once corrupted, have soon become the prey of internal strife or foreign domination. Again: man is made for society, and cannot exist without it: consequently, all the regulations which are really conducive to the maintenance of civil policy and social order must be regarded as evident consequences of our nature, when enlightened to the rational pursuit of its own advantage; and therefore should be considered as intimations of a moral government, carried on through their intervention. In addition to which, it ought to be observed, that these laws may be regarded in another point of view,—as a most important class of moral phenomena; inasmuch as they virtually exhibit the most unexceptionable declarations of reason on this subject, because they are collected from the common consent of mankind, and therefore rendered, in a great measure, independent of the obliquities of individual intellect, the errors of private judgment, and the partial views of self interest, prejudice, or passion. But all the laws of civilized nations, both in their enactment and administration, not only presuppose certain notions concerning the freedom and accountableness of man, the merit and demerit of human actions, and the inseparable connection of virtue and vice with rewards and punishments, but greatly contribute to fix and perpetuate these notions. It is therefore evidently the intention of that part of the moral government with which we are acquainted, to impress these principles deeply on the human mind, and to induce the human race to regulate their conduct accordingly. The laws, then, of this moral government under which we find ourselves placed, and from which we cannot escape, correspond with and corroborate the conclusions deduced from the observation of mental phenomena. And from both we conclude that similar principles of government will be adopted, (so far, at least, as man is concerned,) in other worlds and in future ages; only more developed, and therefore more evidently free from its present apparent imperfections. Upon this account we look, in another life, for some such general disclosure and consummation of the ways and wisdom of Providence as shall vindicate, even in the minor details, the grand principles upon which, generally speaking, the government of God is at present obviously conducted. How this may be done, with many questions connected therewith, reason without revelation could, as I conceive, do little more than form plausible conjectures. Though now that it has pleased God in Christ to bring life and immortality to light through the Gospel," it is possible for reason to estimate the beauty and the mercy and the wisdom of the dispensation by which it has been effected.

Baker's Evangelical Dictionary of Biblical Theology

The created image of God carries with it awesome responsibility and glory. It includes the ability to make meaningful moral choices ( Genesis 1:26-27;  2:16-17 ). By grace, the freedom to use a created will as a moral agent is one of the key biblical distinctions between humans and the rest of the created order. The sovereignty of God is deepened in a radically personal way when creation is climaxed by persons who possess wills that can choose to either obey or disobey, to love or not to love. True sovereignty is neither arbitrary nor coercive; it allows other wills.

The perversion of the fallen will is revealed in the defiant attitude of all who build the blasphemous tower of Babel ( Genesis 11:1-9 ). The story of redemption is founded on God's offer to humanity to return to the fullness of relationship lost in Eden, despite its radical consequences. Not surprisingly, this included a series of moral choices.

The core of sin is the independent use of mind and will to choose what is good or evil ( Genesis 3:5,22 ). Faith and trust ultimately are tested at the level of intention ( Genesis 17:1;  20:5-6 ). Intention in a certain direction is the basic meaning of the Hebrew term aba . It is intriguing that this term of willing determination is most often found in the negative—"not willing" ( Exodus 10:27;  Isaiah 1:19-20 ). Its relation to the verb "to hear" ( sama [   Ezekiel 3:7 ).

It is remarkable that love for God has been commanded ( Deuteronomy 6:5 ). True love cannot be coerced. The obvious implication for this central response to Israel's fundamental statement of God's unique nature is the requirement of loyalty based on the ability to choose. The Western mind quickly shifts to a discussion of the partsheart, soul, and strength. But in the ancient Near East the unified conception of the human being resulted in a complete choice for Yahweh as the only true Lord. The personal attachment of one's being (heart), the direction of one's desires (soul), and the totality of one's devotion (might) have true meaning if there is personal freedom to love God by volitional choice ( Deuteronomy 30:15-20; cf.  Joshua 23:11;  24:14 ).

Biblically, the heart ( leb [   2 Chronicles 11:16;  12:14;  Job 34:14 ). Intention is clearly conjoined with moral responsibility. Both good and evil are revealed prior to actions at the point of one's will ( Genesis 6:5;  Psalm 78:8 ). Thus, rebellion, hardness of heart, or the inner resistance of the will to comply with the obligations of the covenant required an inner transformation for peace to be restored. This is clearly indicated in David's prayer for an "undivided" heart for both fear and praise of God ( Psalm 86:11-12 ). Again, at base it is virtually impossible to separate God's will from the human. The reality of continued uncompelled service and sacrifice depends on the gracious action of God.

The willingness of Yahweh to choose ( 1 Samuel 12:22 ) his own is responded too often by a misuse of will on Israel's part ( Nehemiah 9:17;  Hosea 5:11;  Zechariah 7:11-12 ). God's relationship with his people was restored when they responded to his grace by trying to observe his law with all their hearts. This restored relationship was evidenced by God's desire for and pleasure with freewill offerings ( Exodus 35:29;  Leviticus 23:18 ). The free movement of the will of each party is evident in Israel's understanding of what brought true pleasure ( Psalm 51:15-17 ). There is a willingness that is pleasurable to God ( Malachi 1:8,13 ).

An appraisal of the evidence in the Old Testament reveals a primary focus on the will of God. Humanity images God when it deliberately chooses. Covenantal loyalty and commitment are defined by mutual wills and the choice to love even though, as in the case of Israel, one party is eternally superior ( Deuteronomy 7:7-9 ).

The New Testament only deepens the notions of the significance of human choices that the Old Testament initiated. God's sovereign will is affirmed and the gracious gift of human determination within the context of divine comprehension and direction remain intact throughout.

There are two major word groups: (1) inner volitional purposes or decisions ( boule [   Luke 7:30 , "rejected God's purpose"  1 Corinthians 4:5 ). God's will or desire is perfect, but it is large enough to incorporate and circumvent human will where necessary ( Acts 2:23 ).

As in every area of human life, Jesus is the supreme example of perfect obedience to the will of God without the diminution of personal choice. The use of will in both John and Luke provides not only christological implications but human ramifications as well. A proper interpretation of the prayer in Gethsemane disallows predetermination without the consent of the Savior ( Luke 22:42 ). Jesus prays, "Father, if you are willing ( boule [Βουλή]) yet not my will ( thelema [Θέλημα]), but yours be done."

The crucial issues pertaining to human will are revealed here. Divine will is primarily revealed to humans as the desire to offer salvation. Humanity is invited to respond to that will and provision. Once a person chooses the will of God over his or her own desires, much of what transpires is closely related to the cross. If the will of God pertains primarily to the work of redemption, then that will must become the believer's main intention also. The impact of bearing the will of God shows itself in all the ethical and moral choices a believer makes ( Matthew 22:37;  Mark 12:30;  Philippians 2:13;  Hebrews 13:21 )

M. William Ury

See also Heart; Personhood Person; Will Of God

Bibliography . A. P. Hayman, SJT 37:1 (1984): 13-22.

King James Dictionary

WILL, n. See the Verb.

1. That faculty of the mind by which we determine either to do or forbear an action the faculty which is exercised in deciding, among two or more objects, which we shall embrace or pursue. The will is directed or influenced by the judgment. The understanding or reason compares different objects, which operate as motives the judgment determines which is preferable, and the will decides which to pursue. In other words, we reason with respect to the value or importance of things we then judge which is to be preferred and we will to take the most valuable. These are but different operations of the mind, soul, or intellectual part of man. Great disputes have existed respecting the freedom of the will. Will is often quite a different thing from desire.

A power over a mans subsistence, amounts to a power over his will.

2. Choice determination. It is my will to prosecute the trespasser. 3. Choice discretion pleasure.

Go, then, the guilty at thy will chastise.

4. Command direction.

Our prayers should be according to the will of God.

5. Disposition inclination desire. What is your will, Sir? In this phrase, the word may also signify determination, especially when addressed to a superior. 6. Power arbitrary disposal.

Deliver me not over to the will of my enemies.  Psalms 27 .

7. Divine determination moral purpose or counsel.

Thy will be done. Lords Prayer.

8. Testament the disposition of a mans estate, to take effect after his death. Wills are written, or nuncupative, that is, verbal.

Good will,

1. Favor kindness. 2. Right intention.  Philippians 1 .

Ill will, enmity unfriendliness. It expresses less than malice.

To have ones will, to obtain what is desired.

At will. To hold an estate at the will of another, is to enjoy the possession at his pleasure, and be liable to be ousted at any time by the lessor or proprietor.

Will with a wisp, Jack with a lantern ignis fatuus a luminous appearance sometimes seen in the air over moist ground, supposed to proceed from hydrogen gas.

WILL, G., L., Gr. The sense is to set, or to set forward, to stretch forward. The sense is well expressed by the L.

1. To determine to decide int he mind that something shall be done or forborne implying power to carry the purpose into effect. In this manner God wills whatever comes to pass. So in the style of princes we will that execution be done.

A man that sits still is said to be at liberty, because he can walk if he will it.

2. To command to direct.

Tis yours, O queen! To will the work which duty bids me to fulfill.

3. To be inclined or resolved to have.

There, there, Hortensio, will you any wife?

4. To wish to desire. What will you? 5. To dispose of estate and effects by testament. 6. It is sometimes equivalent to may be. Let the circumstances be what they will that is, any circumstances, of whatever nature. 7. Will is used as an auxiliary verb, and a sign of the future tense. It has different signification in different persons. 1. I will go, is a present promise to go and with an emphasis on will, it expresses determination. 2. Thou wilt go, you will go, express foretelling simply stating an event that is to come. 3. He will go, is also a foretelling. The use of will in the plural, is the same. We will, promises ye will, they will, foretell.

Webster's Dictionary

(1): ( v.) Arbitrary disposal; power to control, dispose, or determine.

(2): ( v.) The legal declaration of a person's mind as to the manner in which he would have his property or estate disposed of after his death; the written instrument, legally executed, by which a man makes disposition of his estate, to take effect after his death; testament; devise. See the Note under Testament, 1.

(3): ( v.) The power of choosing; the faculty or endowment of the soul by which it is capable of choosing; the faculty or power of the mind by which we decide to do or not to do; the power or faculty of preferring or selecting one of two or more objects.

(4): ( v.) The choice which is made; a determination or preference which results from the act or exercise of the power of choice; a volition.

(5): ( adv.) To wish; to desire; to incline to have.

(6): ( adv.) As an auxiliary, will is used to denote futurity dependent on the verb. Thus, in first person, "I will" denotes willingness, consent, promise; and when "will" is emphasized, it denotes determination or fixed purpose; as, I will go if you wish; I will go at all hazards. In the second and third persons, the idea of distinct volition, wish, or purpose is evanescent, and simple certainty is appropriately expressed; as, "You will go," or "He will go," describes a future event as a fact only. To emphasize will denotes (according to the tone or context) certain futurity or fixed determination.

(7): ( v. i.) To be willing; to be inclined or disposed; to be pleased; to wish; to desire.

(8): ( v.) The choice or determination of one who has authority; a decree; a command; discretionary pleasure.

(9): ( v.) Strong wish or inclination; desire; purpose.

(10): ( n.) To form a distinct volition of; to determine by an act of choice; to ordain; to decree.

(11): ( n.) To enjoin or command, as that which is determined by an act of volition; to direct; to order.

(12): ( v.) That which is strongly wished or desired.

(13): ( v. i.) To exercise an act of volition; to choose; to decide; to determine; to decree.

(14): ( n.) To give or direct the disposal of by testament; to bequeath; to devise; as, to will one's estate to a child; also, to order or direct by testament; as, he willed that his nephew should have his watch.

Charles Buck Theological Dictionary

That faculty of the soul by which it chooses or refuses any thing offered to it. When man was created, he had liberty and power to do what was pleasing in the sight of God; but by the fall, he lost all ability of will to any spiritual good; nor has he any will to that which is good until divine grace enlightens the understanding and changes the heart. "The nature of the will, indeed, is in itself indisputably free. Will, as will, must be so, or there is no such faculty; but the human will, being finite, hath a necessary bound, which indeed so far may be said to confine it, because it cannot act beyond it; yet within the extent of its capacity it necessarily is and ever will be spontaneous. "The limits of the will, therefore, do not take away its inherent liberty. The exercise of its powers may be confined, as it necessarily must, in a finite being; but where it is not confined, that exercise will correspond with its nature and situation. "This being understood, it is easy to perceive that man in his fallen state can only will according to his fallen capacities, and that, however freely his volitions may flow within their extent, he cannot possibly overpass them. He, therefore, as a sinful, carnal, and perverse apostate, can will only according to the nature of his apostacy; which is continually and invaribly evil, without capacity to exceed its bounds into goodness, purity, and truth; or otherwise he would will contrary to or beyond his nature and situation, which is equally impossible in itself, and contradictory to the revelation of God.

See Edwards on the Will; Theol. Misc. vol. 4: p. 391; Gill's Cause of God and Truth; Toplady's Historic Proof; Watts' Essay on the Freedom of the Will; Charnock's Works, vol. 2: p. 175, and 187; Locke on the Understanding; Reid on the Active Powers, p. 267, 291; and articles Liberty and Necessity in this work.

Hastings' Dictionary of the Bible

WILL . ‘Will’ and ‘ would ’ are often independent verbs in AV [Note: Authorized Version.] , and being now merely auxiliaries, their force is liable to be missed by the English reader. Thus   Matthew 11:14 ‘if ye will receive it’ (RV [Note: Revised Version.] ‘if ye are willing to receive it’);   John 1:43 ‘Jesus would go forth into Galilee’ (RV [Note: Revised Version.] ‘was minded to go forth’).

WILL . See Paul, p. 692 a; Testament.