Omniscience

Watson's Biblical & Theological Dictionary

This attribute of God is constantly connected in Scripture with his omnipresence, and forms a part of almost every description of that attribute; for, as God is a Spirit, and therefore intelligent, if he is every where, if nothing can exclude him, not even the most solid bodies, nor the minds of intelligent beings, then are all things naked and opened to the eyes of him with whom we have to do. Where he acts, he is; and where he is, he perceives. He understands and considers things absolutely, and as they are in their own natures, powers, properties, differences, together with all the circumstances belonging to them. "Known unto him are all his works from the beginning of the world," rather, απ αιωνος , from all eternity; known before they were made, in their possible, and known, now they are made, in their actual, existence. "Lord, thou hast searched me and known me; thou knowest my down-sitting and mine uprising, thou understandest my thought afar off. Thou compassest my path and my lying down, and art acquainted with all my ways. For there is not a word in my tongue, but lo, O Lord, thou knowest it altogether. The darkness hideth not from thee; but the night shineth as the day. The ways of man are before the eyes of the Lord, and he pondereth all his goings; he searcheth their hearts, and understandeth every imagination of their thoughts." Nor is this perfect knowledge to be confined to men or angels; it reaches into the state of the dead, and penetrates the regions of the damned. "Hell," hades, "is naked before him; and destruction," the seats of destruction, "hath no covering." No limits at all are to be set to this perfection: "Great is the Lord, his understanding is infinite."

In Psalms 94, the knowledge of God is argued from the communication of it to men: "Understand, ye brutish among the people; and, ye fools, when will ye be wise? He that planteth the ear, shall he not hear? He that formed the eye, shall he not see? He that chastiseth the Heathen, shall not he correct? He that teacheth man knowledge, shall not he know?" This argument is as easy as it is conclusive, obliging all who acknowledge a First Cause, to admit his perfect intelligence, or to take refuge in atheism itself. It fetches not the proof from a distance, but refers us to our bosoms for the constant demonstration that the Lord is a God of knowledge, and that by him actions are weighed. We find in ourselves such qualities as thought and intelligence, power and freedom, &c, for which we have the evidence of consciousness as much as for our own existence. Indeed, it is only by our consciousness of these, that our existence is known to ourselves. We know, likewise, that these are perfections, and that to have them is better than to be without them. We find also that they have not been in us from eternity. They must, therefore, have had a beginning, and consequently some cause, for the very same reason that a being beginning to exist in time requires a cause. Now this cause, as it must be superior to its effect, must have those perfections in a superior degree; and if it be the First Cause it must have them in an infinite or unlimited degree, since bounds or limitations, without a limiter, would be an effect without a cause. If God gives wisdom to the wise, and knowledge to men of understanding; if he communicates this perfection to his creatures, the inference must be that he himself is possessed of it in a much more eminent degree than they; that his knowledge is deep and intimate, reaching to the very essence of things, theirs but slight and superficial; his clear and distinct, theirs confused and dark; his certain and infallible, theirs doubtful and liable to mistake; his easy and permanent, theirs obtained with much pains, and soon lost again by the defects of memory or age; his universal and extending to all objects, theirs short and narrow, reaching only to some few things, while that which is wanting cannot be numbered; and therefore, as the heavens are higher than the earth, so, as the prophet has told us, are his ways above our ways, and his thoughts above our thoughts.

But his understanding is infinite; a doctrine which the sacred writers not only authoritatively announce, but confirm by referring to the wisdom displayed in his works. The only difference between wisdom and knowledge is, that the former always supposes action, and action directed to an end. But wherever there is wisdom there must be knowledge; and as the wisdom of God in the creation consists in the formation of things which, by themselves, or in combination with others, shall produce certain effects, and that in a variety of operation which is to us boundless, the previous knowledge of the possible qualities and effects inevitably supposes a knowledge which can have no limit. For as creation out of nothing argues a power which is omnipotent; so the knowledge of the possibilities of things which are not (a knowledge which, from the effect, we are sure must exist in God,) argues that such a Being must be omniscient. For all things being not only present to him, but also entirely depending upon him, and having received both their being itself, and all their powers and faculties from him; it is manifest that, as he knows all things that are, so he must likewise know all possibilities of things, that is, all effects that can be. For, being himself alone self-existent, and having alone given to all things all the powers and faculties they are endued with; it is evident he must of necessity know perfectly what all and each of those powers and faculties, which are derived wholly from himself, can possibly produce: and seeing, at one boundless view, all the possible compositions and divisions, variations and changes, circumstances and dependencies of things; all their possible relations one to another, and their dispositions or fitnesses to certain and respective ends, he must, without possibility of error, know exactly what is best and properest in every one of the infinite possible cases or methods of disposing things; and understand perfectly how to order and direct the respective means, to bring about what he so knows to be, in its kind, or in the whole, the best and fittest in the end. This is what we mean by infinite wisdom.

On the subject of the divine omniscience, many fine sentiments are to be found in the writings of Pagans; for an intelligent First Cause being in any sense admitted, it was most natural and obvious to ascribe to him a perfect knowledge of all things. They acknowledge that nothing is hid from God, who is intimate to our minds, and mingles himself with our very thoughts; nor were they all unaware of the practical tendency of such a doctrine, and of the motive it affords to a cautious and virtuous conduct. But among them it was not held, as by the sacred writers, in connection with other right views of the divine nature, which are essential to give to this its full moral effect. Not only on this subject does the manner in which the Scriptures state the doctrine far transcend that of the wisest Pagan theists; but the moral of the sentiment is infinitely more comprehensive and impressive. With them it is connected with man's state of trial; with a holy law, all the violations of which, in thought, word, and deed, are both infallibly known, and strictly marked; with promises of grace, and of a mild and protecting government as to all who have sought and found the mercy of God in forgiving their sins and admitting them into his family. The wicked are thus reminded, that their hearts are searched, and their sins noted; that the eyes of the Lord are upon their ways; and that their most secret works will be brought to light in the day when God the witness shall become God the judge. But as to the righteous, the eyes of the Lord are said to be over them; that they are kept by him who never slumbers or sleeps; that he is never far from them; that his eyes run to and fro throughout the whole earth, to show himself strong in their behalf; that foes, to them invisible, are seen by his eye, and controlled by his arm; and that this great attribute, so appalling to wicked men, affords to them, not only the most influential reason for a perfectly holy temper and conduct, but the strongest motive to trust, and joy, and hope, amidst the changes and afflictions of the present life. Socrates, as well as other philosophers, could express themselves well, so long as they expressed themselves generally, on this subject. The former could say, "Let your own frame instruct you. Does the mind inhabiting your body dispose and govern it with ease? Ought you not then to conclude, that the universal Mind with equal ease actuates and governs universal nature; and that, when you can at once consider the interest of the Athenians at home, in Egypt, and in Sicily, it is not too much for the divine wisdom to take care of the universe?

These reflections will soon convince you, that the greatness of the divine mind is such, as at once to see all things, hear all things, be present every where, and direct all the affairs of the world." These views are just, but they wanted that connection with others relative both to the divine nature and government, which we see only in the Bible, to render them influential; they neither gave correct moral distinctions nor led to a virtuous practice, no, not in Socrates, who, on some subjects, and especially on the personality of the Deity, and his independence on matter, raised himself far above the rest of his philosophic brethren, but in moral feeling and practice was perhaps as censurable as they. See Prescience .

Hastings' Dictionary of the New Testament

Omniscience ( of Christ).—There are such great differences in the mental grasp of different persons, that no one can prove that all knowledge may not have been open to the human mind of Christ. On the other hand, no one can assert that because of His Divine nature in union with His human nature He must have possessed and exercised such powers. It seems to be left quite open to us, unbiassed in the one direction or in the other, to deal with each department of His knowledge,—as of history before His coming, of nature, and of the future,—and to come to the conclusion that His knowledge included any matter or did not include it, without introducing the dogmatic fallacy that He must, because of His omniscience, have known this or that. Apart from assurance of what God has done, we cannot say what He must do. And this applies to the conditions of the earthly life which it seemed good to the Father that Christ should live.

When we come to the testimony of Scripture, we find Christ growing in knowledge ( Luke 2:52), and afterwards limiting Himself to be a teacher not even in matters of civil justice ( Luke 12:14), but only in the highest region of religion. In a sense, every prophet who says what God will do, claims a knowledge which dominates all the details of God’s providence in every department ( 1 John 2:20 ‘Ye know all things’). And in this sense, and in higher measure, Christ was omniscient. In the words of Luther, ‘He was full of grace and wisdom, and able to judge upon and teach all that came before Him’ (Dorner, Person of Christ , ii. 92). Thus His disciples said of Him, ‘Thou knowest all things’ ( John 16:30;  John 21:17). ‘He knew what was in man’ ( John 2:25).

It is usual to refer to  Mark 13:32, where Christ disclaims knowledge of the day of His coming, as evidence that there were limitations to our Lord’s knowledge. On the other hand, in His discourse with Nathanael and with the woman of Samaria, He showed supernatural knowledge. See, further, artt. Accommodation, Kenosis.

Literature.—Liddon, Bamp. Lect. 8 [Note: designates the particular edition of the work referred] 456 ff.; Gore, Bamp. Lect. 5 [Note: designates the particular edition of the work referred] 147 ff.; Wendt, Teaching of Jesus , ii. 341 ff.; Beyschlag, Leben Jesu , i. 171 ff., NT Theol. i. 73 ff.; Orr, Christian View of God and the World , p. 287 ff.; Powell, Principle of the Incarnation , 125 ff.

T. Gregory,

Charles Spurgeon's Illustration Collection

A plate of sweet cakes was brought in and placed upon the table. Two children played upon the hearth rug before the fire. 'Oh, I want one of these cakes!' cried the little boy, jumping up as soon as his mother went out, and going on tiptoe towards the table. 'No, no,' said his sister, pulling him back; 'no, no; you must not touch.' 'Mother won't know it; she did not count them,' he cried, shaking her off, and stretching out his hand. 'If she didn't, perhaps God counted,' answered the other. The little boy's hand was stayed. Yes, children, be sure that God counts I: children's Missionary Recorder 1852.

Holman Bible Dictionary

 Psalm 147:5 Psalm 139:1-6 Matthew 6:4 6:6 6:8 Job 23:10 Psalm 34:15-16 Psalm 90:8 Proverbs 15:3 1 Peter 3:12God

Webster's Dictionary

(n.) The quality or state of being omniscient; - an attribute peculiar to God.

International Standard Bible Encyclopedia

om - nish´ens  : The term does not occur in Scripture, either in its nominal or in its adjectival form.

1. Words and Usage:

In the Old Testament it is expressed in connection with such words as דּעת , da‛ath , בּינה , bı̄nāh , תּבוּנה , tebhūnāh , חכמה , ḥokhmāh  ; also "seeing" and "hearing," "the eye" and "the ear" occur as figures for the knowledge of God, as "arm," "hand," "finger" serve to express His power. In the New Testament are found γινώσκειν , ginṓskein , γνῶσις , gnṓsis , εἰδέναι , eidénai , σοφία , sophı́a , in the same connections.

2. Tacit Assumption and Explicit Affirmation:

Scripture everywhere teaches the absolute universality of the divine knowledge. In the historical books, although there is no abstract formula, and occasional anthropomorphic references to God'staking knowledge of things occur ( Genesis 11:5;  Genesis 18:21;  Deuteronomy 8:3 ), none the less the principle is everywhere presupposed in what is related about God's cognizance of the doings of man, about the hearing of prayer, the disclosing of the future ( 1 Samuel 16:7;  1 Samuel 23:9-12;  1 Kings 8:39;  2 Chronicles 16:9 ). Explicit affirmation of the principle is made in the Psalter, the Prophets, the ḥokhmāh literature and in the New Testament. This is due to the increased internalizing of religion, by which its hidden side, to which the divine omniscience corresponds, receives greater emphasis ( Job 26:6;  Job 28:24;  Job 34:22;  Psalm 139:12;  Psalm 147:4;  Proverbs 15:3 ,  Proverbs 15:11;  Isaiah 40:26;  Acts 1:24;  Hebrews 4:13;  Revelation 2:23 ).

3. Extends to All Spheres:

This absolute universality is affirmed with reference to the various categories that comprise within themselves all that is possible or actual. It extends to God's own being, as well as to what exists outside of Him in the created world. God has perfect possession in consciousness of His own being. The unconscious finds no place in Him ( Acts 15:18;  1 John 1:5 ). Next to Himself God knows the world in its totality. This knowledge extends to small as well as to great affairs ( Matthew 6:8 ,  Matthew 6:32;  Matthew 10:30 ); to the hidden heart and mind of man as well as to that which is open and manifest ( Job 11:11;  Job 34:21 ,  Job 34:23;  Psalm 14:2;  Psalm 17:2 ff;   Psalm 33:13-18;  Psalm 102:19 f;   Psalm 139:1-4;  Proverbs 5:21;  Proverbs 15:3;  Isaiah 29:15;  Jeremiah 17:10;  Amos 4:13;  Luke 16:15;  Acts 1:24;  1 Thessalonians 2:4;  Hebrews 4:13;  Revelation 2:23 ). It extends to all the divisions of time, the past, present and future alike ( Job 14:17;  Psalm 56:8;  Isaiah 41:22-24;  Isaiah 44:6-8;  Jeremiah 1:5;  Hosea 13:12;  Malachi 3:16 ). It embraces that which is contingent from the human viewpoint as well as that which is certain ( 1 Samuel 23:9-12;  Matthew 11:22 ,  Matthew 11:23 ).

4. Mode of the Divine Knowledge:

Scripture brings God's knowledge into connection with His omnipresence.  Psalm 139 is the clearest expression of this. Omniscience is the omnipresence of cognition (  Jeremiah 23:23 ff). It is also closely related to God's eternity, for the latter makes Him in His knowledge independent of the limitations of time (  Isaiah 43:8-12 ). God's creative relation to all that exists is represented as underlying His omniscience ( Psalm 33:15;  Psalm 97:9;  Psalm 139:13;  Isaiah 29:15 ). His all-comprehensive purpose forms the basis of His knowledge of all events and developments ( Isaiah 41:22-27;  Amos 3:7 ).

This, however, does not mean that God's knowledge of things is identical with His creation of them, as has been suggested by Augustine and others. The act of creation, while necessarily connected with the knowledge of that which is to be actual, is not identical with such knowledge or with the purpose on which such knowledge rests, for in God, as well as in man, the intellect and the will are distinct faculties. In the last analysis, God's knowledge of the world has its source in His self-knowledge. The world is a revelation of God. All that is actual or possible in it therefore is a reflection in created form of what exists uncreated in God, and thus the knowledge of the one becomes a reproduction of the knowledge of the other ( Acts 17:27;  Romans 1:20 ). The divine knowledge of the world also partakes of the quality of the divine self-knowledge in this respect, that it is never dormant. God does not depend for embracing the multitude and complexity of the existing world on such mental processes as abstraction and generalization.

The Bible nowhere represents Him as attaining to knowledge by reasoning, but everywhere as simply knowing. From what has been said about the immanent sources of the divine knowledge, it follows that the latter is not a posteriori derived from its objects, as all human knowledge based on experience is, but is exercised without receptivity or dependence. In knowing, as well as in all other activities of His nature, God is sovereign and self-sufficient. In cognizing the reality of all things He needs not wait upon the things, but draws His knowledge directly from the basis of reality as it lies in Himself. While the two are thus closely connected it is nevertheless of importance to distinguish between God's knowledge of Himself and God's knowledge of the world, and also between His knowledge of the actual and His knowledge of the possible. These distinctions mark off theistic conception of omniscience from the pantheistic idea regarding it. God is not bound up in His life with the world in such a sense as to have no scope of activity beyond it.

5. God's Omniscience and Human Freewill:

Since Scripture includes in the objects of the divine knowledge also the issue of the exercise of freewill on the part of man, the problem arises, how the contingent character of such decisions and the certainty of the divine knowledge can coexist. It is true that the knowledge of God and the purposing will of God are distinct, and that not the former but the latter determines the certainty of the outcome. Consequently the divine omniscience in such cases adds or detracts nothing in regard to the certainty of the event. God's omniscience does not produce but presupposes the certainty by which the problem is raised. At the same time, precisely because omniscience presupposes certainty, it appears to exclude every conception of contingency in the free acts of man, such as would render the latter in their very essence undetermined. The knowledge of the issue must have a fixed point of certainty to terminate upon, if it is to be knowledge at all. Those who make the essence of freedom absolute indeterminateness must, therefore, exempt this class of events from the scope of the divine omniscience. But this is contrary to all the testimony of Scripture, which distinctly makes God's absolute knowledge extend to such acts ( Acts 2:23 ). It has been attempted to construe a peculiar form of the divine knowledge, which would relate to this class of acts specifically, the so-called scientia media , to be distinguished from the scientia necessaria , which has for its object God Himself, and the scientia libera which terminates upon the certainties of the world outside of God, as determined by His freewill. This scientia media would then be based on God's foresight of the outcome of the free choice of man. It would involve a knowledge of receptivity, a contribution to the sum total of what God knows derived from observation on His part of the world-process. That is to say, it would be knowledge a posteriori in essence, although not in point of time. It is, however, difficult to see how such a knowledge can be possible in God, when the outcome is psychologically undetermined and undeterminable. The knowledge could originate no sooner than the determination originates through the free decision of man. It would, therefore, necessarily become an a posteriori knowledge in time as well as in essence. The appeal to God's eternity as bringing Him equally near to the future as to the present and enabling Him to see the future decisions of man's free will as though they were present cannot remove this difficulty, for when once the observation and knowledge of God are made dependent on any temporal issue, the divine eternity itself is thereby virtually denied. Nothing remains but to recognize that God's eternal knowledge of the outcome of the freewill choices of man implies that there enters into these choices, notwithstanding their free character, an element of predetermination, to which the knowledge of God can attach itself.

6. Religious Importance:

The divine omniscience is most important for the religious life. The very essence of religion as communion with God depends on His all-comprehensive cognizance of the life of man at every moment. Hence, it is characteristic of the irreligious to deny the omniscience of God ( Psalm 10:11 ,  Psalm 10:12;  Psalm 94:7-9;  Isaiah 29:15;  Jeremiah 23:23;  Ezekiel 8:12;  Ezekiel 9:9 ). Especially along three lines this fundamental religious importance reveals itself: ( a ) it lends support and comfort when the pious suffer from the misunderstanding and misrepresentation of men; ( b ) it acts as a deterrent to those tempted by sin, especially secret sin, and becomes a judging principle to all hypocrisy and false security; ( c ) it furnishes the source from which man's desire for self-knowledge can obtain satisfaction ( Psalm 19:12;  Psalm 51:6;  Psalm 139:23 ,  Psalm 139:24 ).

Literature.

Oehler, Theologie des AT3 , 876; Riehm, Alttestamentliche Theologie , 263; Dillmann, Handbuch der alttestamentlichen Theologie , 249; Davidson, Old Testament Theology , 180 if.

Cyclopedia of Biblical, Theological and Ecclesiastical Literature

the third essential or natural attribute of God, is that perfection by which he knows all things. This is:

1. Infinite ( Psalms 147:5);

2. Eternal ( Isaiah 46:10;  Acts 2:23;  Acts 15:18;  Ephesians 1:4);

3. Universal, extending to all persons, times, places, and things (Psalms 1, 10-13;  Hebrews 4:13);

4. Perfect, relating to what is past, present, and to come. He knows all independently, distinctly, infallibly, and perpetually ( Jeremiah 10:6-7;  Romans 11:33).

5. This knowledge Is Peculiar to himself, and not communicable to any creature ( Job 36:4;  Mark 13:32).

6. This attribute is incomprehensible to us, how God knows all things, yet it is evident that he dies; for to suppose otherwise is to suppose him an imperfect Being, and at variance with the revelation he has given of himself ( Job 21:22;  Job 28:24;  Psalms 139:6;  1 John 3:20).

This attribute of God is constantly connected in Scripture with his omnipresence, and forms a part of almost every description of that attribute; for as God is a spirit, and therefore intelligent, if he is everywhere, if nothing can exclude him, not even the most solid bodies, nor the minds of intelligent beings, then, indeed, as Paul avers, are "all things naked and open to the eyes of him with whom we have to do." Where he acts, he is; and where he is, he perceives. He understands and considers -things absolutely, and as they are in their own natures, forms, properties, differences, together with all the circumstances belonging to them, "Known unto him are all his works from the beginning. of the world," rather from all eternity, known before they were made, and known now they are made, in their actual existence. It is also properly associated with his omnipotence; so that God is universal in his perfections.

Two theological, or rather metaphysical, questions have been raised on this subject.

1. Whether this knowledge is all equally present to the divine consciousness, or only brought up as occasion requires. That the latter position cannot be true may be argued from the consideration that it would imply an imperfection or limitation in God's knowledge itself, inasmuch as it would thus become partial and fragmentary. The "occasion" implied in the supposition must be either in the divine mind, or else outside of it. If ab intra, it must be either voluntary or involuntary. The former involves the absurdity of supposing a volition respecting a subject not consciously present at the time to the mind of the wilier, and the latter leaves the matter subject to some secret law of variable and therefore contingent action. If, on the other hand, the supposed occasion be ab extra, then still more palpably must the knowledge be fluctuating, and even uncertain altogether. In short, we cannot predicate of the divine mind any such laws of mental association as those which call up stores of information in human thoughts: these belong only to finite and imperfect beings. Knowledge is not latent in God's consciousness; his nature precludes such a supposition. Even with ourselves positive knowledge or absolute certainty springs only from consciousness; all else is merely belief, probability, reasoning, etc. Memory itself is but the reflex action of consciousness. With God, as there is no need of information or inference, so knowledge must be simple intuition, or what is in human language consciousness of all truth, possible as well as actual, throughout that infinity of time and space which his presence permeates.

2. The other and more important question mooted relates to God ' S Foreknowledge of the future. This, Calvinistic theologians generally affirm, depends upon his Predetermination of all things. Of course, a Being of infinite power must know that his will cannot be frustrated, and may therefore predict with certainty whatever he ordains. But this is not really knowledge at all; it is simply Reasoning, a rapid conclusion from certain data. If the foregoing views are correct, God does not Properly Foreknow or Remember anything. He simply knows everything — past, present, and future — by virtue of that absolute and infinite intuition which takes in the entire range of fact and, possibility in one everlasting survey. In the lofty language of Holy Writ, he "inhabiteth eternity." Of course, however, he knows events in their true relation and sequence as to time, and he also knows that they might have been, might now or hereafter be, otherwise, i.e.he contemplates at the same time with the certain the contingent also, and even the imaginary. For mere mortals, within their finite sphere of the past and present, may do this. The essential difference — aside from the enlarged field of view — is, that God looks upon the future just as we do upon the past, but by a peculiar faculty inherent in Deity alone. Any other view reduces God to but a man of larger proportions. See the literature referred to in Malcom, Theol. Index, s.v.; and comp. (See Prescience).