Cause
King James Dictionary [1]
CAUSE, n. s as z.
1. A suit or action in court any legal process which a party institutes to obtain his demand, or by which he seeks his right or his supposed right. This is a legal, scriptural and popular use of the word, coinciding nearly with case from cado, and action from ago, to urge or drive.
The cause of both parties shall come before the judges. Exodus 22 .
2. That which produces an effect that which impels into existence, or by its agency or operation produces what did not before exist that by virtue of which any thing is done that from which any thing proceeds, and without which it would not exist.
Cause is a substance exerting its power into act, to make a thing begin to be.
3. The reason or motive that urges, moves, or impels the mind to act or decide.
For this cause have I raised up Pharaoh. Exodus 9 .
And David said, is there not a cause? 1 Samuel 17 .
4. Sake account.
I did it not for his cause that had done the wrong. 2 Corinthians 6 . See Sake.
5. That which a party or nation pursues or rather pursuit, prosecution of an object. We say, Bible Societies are engaged in a noble cause. See the first definition. Hence the word cause is used to denote that which a person or thing favors that to which the efforts of an intelligent being are directed as, to promote religion is to advance the cause of God. So we say, the cause of truth or of justice. In all its applications, cause retains something of its original meaning, struggle, impelling force, contest, effort to obtain or to effect something.
6. Without cause, without good reason without a reason or motive to justify the act.
They hate me without cause. Psalms 35 . 69 .
CAUSE,
1. To produce to bring into existence.
They caused great joy to all the brethren. Acts 15 .
2. To effect by agency, power or influence.
I will cause it to rain on the earth forty days. Genesis 7 .
I will cause him to fall by the sword. 2 Kings 19 .
CAUSE, To assign insufficient cause.
Vine's Expository Dictionary of NT Words [2]
"a cause:" see Accusation , A, No. 1.
"a fault" (synonymous with No. 1, but more limited in scope), is translated "cause (of death)" in Luke 23:22; "cause" in Acts 19:40 (of a riot); "fault" in Luke 23:4,14 . See Fault.
"a word spoken for any purpose," denotes, in one place, a cause or reason assigned, Matthew 5:32 .
lit., "instead of this," i.e., "for this cause," signifying the principle or motive, Ephesians 5:31 .
lit., "on account of this, for this cause," signifying the ground or reason, e.g., RV in Mark 12:24; John 1:31; 5:16,18; 6:65; 7:22; 8:47; 12:18,27,39; Romans 1:26; 4:16; 13:6; 1 Corinthians 4:17; 11:10,30; Ephesians 1:15; Colossians 1:9; 1 Thessalonians 2:13; 3:5,7; 2 Thessalonians 2:11; 1 Timothy 1:16; Hebrews 9:15; 1 John 3:1 .
lit., "for the sake of this," therefore, "as a reason for," Matthew 19:5; Mark 10:7; heneka touton, "for the sake of these things," Acts 26:21; and heneken tou, "for the cause of the (one), etc. 2 Corinthians 7:12 (twice).
"for this cause," not simply as a reason, as in the preceding phrase, but in favor of, Ephesians 3:1,14; Titus 1:5 .
lit., "(as to) this very thing," 2 Peter 1:5 .
John 18:37 Romans 15:22 2 Corinthians 4:16Wherefore Philippians 2:18
lit., "as a gift, gratis," (connected with doron, "a gift"), is rendered "without a cause," John 15:25; "for nought," 2 Corinthians 11:7; Galatians 2:21; 2 Thessalonians 3:8; "freely," Matthew 10:8; Romans 3:24; Revelation 21:6; 22:17 .
Matthew 5:22 Acts 25:14Case. 2 Corinthians 5:13
"to do," is translated by the verb "to cause" in John 11:37; Acts 15:3; Romans 16:17; Colossians 4:16; Revelation 13:15,16 . See Do.
"to give," is translated "cause" in 1 Corinthians 9:12 , RV, for AV, "(lest we) should."
Matthew 5:32 2 Corinthians 9:11 2 Corinthians 2:14
International Standard Bible Encyclopedia [3]
kôs : In both the King James Version and the Revised Version (British and American) "for this cause" (the King James Version "cause") occurs in Exodus 9:16 as the rendering of בּעבוּר זאת , ba‛ăbhūr zō'th = "in order that"; "to the end that"; so also in Daniel 2:12 for כּל־קבל דּנה , kol - ḳebhēl denāh , and in 2 Chronicles 32:20 the King James Version for על־זאת , ‛al - zō'th , where Rvs read "because of." In the New Testament the word is used adverbially in the translation of several Greek phrases: ἕνεκα τούτου , héneka toútou ( Matthew 19:5; Mark 10:7 ); διὰ τοῦτο , diá toúto , John 12:27; Romans 1:26; Romans 13:6; Romans 15:9 (the Revised Version (British and American) "therefore"); 1 Corinthians 11:30; 1 Thessalonians 2:13; 2 Thessalonians 2:11; 1 Timothy 1:16; Hebrews 9:15; εἰς τούτο , eis toúto , John 18:37 (where the King James Version varying the phraseology reads "to this end" "for this cause"); 1 Peter 4:6 the King James Version; τούτου χάριν , toútou chárin , Ephesians 3:14 . Unusual renderings occur, as "for his cause" (= "because of"), 2 Corinthians 7:12; as = "affair," "thing," obsolete in the King James Version 1 Kings 12:15; 2 Chronicles 10:15 , where the word occurs as a paraphrase of נסבּה , neṣibbā̄h (= "turn of affairs"). In 1 Samuel 25:31 (King James Version, the Revised Version (British and American)) "causeless" (= without cause the American Standard Revised Version) occurs arbitrarily in adverb sense.
Cyclopedia of Biblical, Theological and Ecclesiastical Literature [4]
(Causations Causality). These are associated terms in connection with a fundamental topic in the highest range of philosophical speculation.
I. Definition of Cause. This will always be determined-at least so far as the real import of the term is concerned by the character of the theory, in which it constitutes an essential part. Therefore, it cannot be given without reference to such theory, at least so as, to convey either a clear or a fixed meaning. The significance of the word must accordingly be derived from the tenor and conclusion's of the connection. The objection to the received definitions is, that they assume at the outset what is to be explained by the close. This is true of Reid's definition of the popular idea of Cause. "Causa est id, quoposito ponitur eijectus, quo sublato tollitur." So, in Whewell (Phil. Id. Sci. pt. 1, bk. 3, chap. 2, p. 159) "By Cause we mean some quality, power, or efficacy, by which a state of things produces a succeeding state." The words, "effectus," "power," "efficacy," "produces," beg the question, and require explanation and' acceptance in advance of the definition. As a preliminary and provisional exposition, for the purpose of inquiry, we may be permitted to say, that Cause is the agency, real or assumed, in the production of change; Causation, the exercise of such agency; and Causality, the bond of connection between the antecedent condition and the subsequent change. Causation and Causality are, however, frequently used as equivalent terms. It will not escape the notice of those familiar with investigations of the present character, that there is a latent petitio principii in the introduction of the words agency and production. This acknowledged parologism, noted already by Humime, is inevitable, from the peculiarity of the subject, from the implications of words, and their multiplicity of meanings. The fallacy involved will not be directed to the support of any conclusion. It is admitted and tolerated simply to furnish a point of departure for the doctrine of Cause, Causation, and Causality.
Before proceeding to this task, it is requisite to discriminate between the ordinary and the metaphysical employment of the term Cause, The word is full of ambiguities, and is a shifting homonym in both characters. In customary usage, as a common expression, which has passed through many successive stages of metaphor and degradation, to descend to its current laxity and vagueness, it indicates the immediate, or remote, agency of change; the motive, the occasion, the aim, the accidental, partial, antecedent, or concomitant condition of a phenomenon, without distinguishing, or even regarding, the diverse character of these several applications. With these loose meanings there will be no need to be concerned, except so far as they may illustrate the fluctuations of the philosophical import, by reflecting in their variety the speculative perplexities whence they have arisen.
Cause in Metaphysics may be said to be the connection between two states of being, the one consequent upon the other. This awkward circumlocution is employed to prevent, as far as may be, the introduction of any phrase which would virtually beg the question, or anticipate the conclusion. The absence of any precise and suitable terminology, or, rather, the indistinct- ness, variability, and inapprehensibility of the idea of what is spoken of, which occasions such absence, necessitates the adoption of this unsatisfactory procedure. Yet it may be said that, in spite of the acute and varied speculations of the philosophers, every one has a fixed, if unanalyzed, conception of Causation. To this indeterminate notion, present in the mind, reference must always be had, as a support for the reasoning, in order to render any argument on the subject intelligible. To Aristotle (Metaph. 1, 2; Phys. Ause. 2, 3) is due the well-established division of Causes into:
1. Formal, or qualitative, revival, which gives the quantity, per quod.
2. The Material, or Substantive, ex quo.
3. The Efficient, a quo.
4. The Final, propter quod.
This celebrated classification was seen to be invalid, by Reid (Works, p. 75; ed. Hamilton). It is rather an analysis of the ambiguities of speech, consequent won ambiguities of thought, than a legitimate distinction. Careful and discriminating reflection would apparently indicate, that these species do not belong to one and the same genus. The division is not made on one plane not in accordance with one principle. It is scarcely possible to refer to the same order of conceptions, that the joiner made the table, that the table was made of wood, that tables require the character exhibited by them, and that the table is made to put victuals on.
The Final Cause, or the result contemplated, is rejected by Bacon and Descartes, and by many of the most rigorous reasoners; but is maintained by Leibnitz and other perspicacious inquirers. The aim is an inducement, but it cannot-be properly considered as part of the act of Causation, whatever Causation may be. The purpose for which a thing is. done is surely diverse from the act or operation by which it is done.
The Material Cause has been strenuously held to be an indispensable part of the process resulting in an Effect. By some writers it has been regarded as the sole cause. Aristotle considers that, in some cases, Cause and Effect are conjoint and logically simultaneous-the one is involved in the other. Hamilton asserts that all Secondary Causes (all causes but the "Great First Cause") are Siamese twins, the Material Cause necessarily participating and co-operating with the Productive Cause. This is true in a certain sense. There must be a subject to be acted on. "Esse deet, salde fat aliquid, deinde a quo flat," No effect can arise unless it arises in something. But the idea of Cause is entirely dissimilar in regard to the agent and in regard to the passive element.
The Formal Cause-the Plutonic archetype — the natura naturata — the plan — the aggregate of qualities constituting a thing "what it is," and pre:adapting it to exhibit under suitable incitement the characteristic phenomena, is, in most schemes, analogous, ex parte natura, to the Material Cause, and is obnoxious to similar censure. The Aristotelian Form must be distinguished from shape as well as from the Platonic Idea.
The Material and the Formal Cause are rather prerequisites, indispensable concomitants, conditions, aptitudes, than any part of the act or idea of Causation. No doubt, the qualities of the things in which the change is evolved, and the relations of constitution between them and the stimulant which excites the change, regulate the occurrence and the character of the Effect; but they do not aid in the apprehension of the abstract idea, or act of Causation. They do not touch the conception of Causality. The Efficient, or Motive Cause, that which involves the manifestation of power, according to Kant, is the only form which directly conveys the conception of Cause (of. Aristot. Metaph. 11, 4, 6). Therefore, in endeavoring to estimate the nature of Causation, it is the species which will be exclusively regarded. Occasional Causes belong to an entirely distinct inquiry
. (See Malebranche). Other Causes, which might be added to Aristotle's specification, such as Exemplary Causes, with which Formal Causes are often identified, and Instrumental Causes, are equally to be disregarded.
II. Theories of Causation. — The theories and modifications of theories of Causation are very numerous, and often reappear in strange combinations. It is not appropriate to discuss them in this place. Sir William Hamilton has done this very ably and elaborately ( Discuss. App. 1; Metaph. § 39:40), if not always with entire satisfaction. He has added a Table, in which he has endeavored to classify the several systems which have met with any considerable acceptance, excluding, of course, the doctrine of the First Cause, the primordial, or immanent operation of the Creator. Hamilton's Table is introduced, as it may save much explanation which would otherwise be required.
This classification is, like all Hamilton's dissections, acute, arbitrary, plausible, incomplete-Systematic, but delusive from its apparent thoroughness. There are other actual and possible theories, Schopenhauer's, for instance, which he has not provided for in his scheme. Hamilton makes eight classes, all of which he rejects as "wholly worthless," except the last, which is his own, and is open to as grave objections as those which he repudiates. He distributes all his recognized Opinions between two summa genera: A, the Empirical, or a posteriori; and B, the Pure, Noetic, or a priori. The former set, by making the conception of Causation a mere result of experience, renders it nothing more than an empty Ens, or, rather, Phantasma Rationis. Locke, Humes and Browun are types of these schools.
It may be observed, in passing, that the contemptuous terms in which Hamilton speaks of Brown's theory, which he includes in the sixth class, but which is more analogous to Locke's, may be retorted upon his own. "It evacuates the phenomenon of all that desiderates explanation," and "eviscerates the problem of its sole difficulty." The Empirical systems may be confidently repudiated as inadequate explanations of the mystery, for the reasons assigned by Hamilton, and for others not specified by him. A ready concurrence may also be accorded to his refutation of two of the Pure theories the sixth and seventh. But there is one of them, besides his own, the fifth, that which is maintained in diverse modifications "by Descartes, Leibnitz, Reid, Stewart, Kant, Fichte, Cousin, and the majority of recent philosophers," which cannot be discarded so ‘ readily. Its consideration may be postponed till Hamilton's original theory has been noticed.
Hamilton's scheme rests avowedly, as might have been expected, on the Philosophy of the Conditioned. He does not succeed in makings it evident that it is a logical consequence of his peculiar philosophy. He says: "We cannot know, we cannot: think, a thing except as existing, that is, under the category of existence; and we cannot know or think a thing as existing, except in time." Now the application of the Law of. the Conditioned to any object thought as existent, and thought as in time, will give us at once the phenomenon of Causality (Metaph. p. 552). There is a quibble in the word "existence" which need not be dwelt upon. The reasoning is per saltun, if not a palpable non sequitur. There is no connection manifest between the inference and its supposed foundation. Moreover, Causation, the principle of change id a quo formia mutatura is completely eliminated from consideration.
Hamilton refers the belief in Causes, which is not identical with the idea of Causation, to the impossibility of conceiving any new existence to commence, or any existence to be annihilated. The impossibility of conceiving an absolute commencement of existence is a thesis as old as Aristotle, (Met. Min. II, 1). But it can only suggest the catenation of existence, it cannot of itself suggest Causation. Hamilton illustrates his position by the line: "Ex nihilo nihil, in nihilum ni posse reverti." He thus places himself on the ground of Stoic Pantheism or Epicurean Materialism. His dogma would only justify, "omne post aliquid, sed non infinite aliquid ante omnia." In consonance with this fallacy, he confirms his doctrine by representing the Creation as evolved out of the Creator. This: accords with his identification of the causaturn with the
